在落地PIM矩阵的设计思路之前，我们需要回答一个问题——员工愿不愿意参与对赌，也就是投入一笔本金以获得经营收益的分享资格？这是我们回答了多次的问题。以前，我们会告诉企业，只要杠杆率合适，只要投入可控，员工没有理由拒绝。但依然会有“铁脑袋”把员工的风险敏感度无限放大，来挑战我们的逻辑。

Before implementing the design idea of PIM matrix, we need to answer a question: are employees willing to participate in gambling, that is, to invest a sum of principal to obtain the qualification to share operating income? This is a question we have answered many times. In the past, we would tell enterprises that as long as the leverage ratio is appropriate and the investment is controllable, employees have no reason to refuse. But there will still be "iron head" to enlarge the staff's risk sensitivity infinitely, to challenge our logic.

这次的调研让我们获得了一个强证据。数据显示，超过90%的样本企业员工有意愿参与对赌激励，说明这种激励机制是有群众基础的。另外，组织内已实行对赌激励的企业占比27%，这种激励机制已经不是新鲜事物了，其普及程度可能远远超过各位的想象。

This survey gives us a strong evidence. The data shows that more than 90% of the sample employees are willing to participate in the gambling incentive, which shows that this incentive mechanism has a mass basis. In addition, 27% of the enterprises in the organization have implemented gambling incentive. This incentive mechanism is not new, and its popularity may far exceed your imagination.

如果对赌跟投的逻辑没有问题，那我们接下来应该问问PIM矩阵的几个关键决策点。这几个决策点用几个由我设计的关键指标来代表，这几个指标的设置不合理，也会导致激励机制的崩塌。

If there is no problem with the logic of gambling and investing, then we should ask several key decision points of PIM matrix. These decision-making points are represented by several key indicators designed by me. Unreasonable setting of these indicators will also lead to the collapse of the incentive mechanism.

一是跟投比，即员工跟投的量应该占工资的多少？

One is the ratio of follow-up investment, that is, how much should the amount of follow-up investment of employees account for the salary?

二是杠杆率，即员工跟投的量可以撬动多大的收益？

Second, the leverage ratio, that is, how much revenue can employees leverage?

三是贴现率，即在经营单元或项目结算之前，应该给员工释放多少比例的奖金？

The third is the discount rate, that is, before the settlement of business units or projects, what percentage of bonus should be released to employees?

先说跟投比和杠杆率的问题。

Let's talk about the following investment ratio and leverage ratio first.

从回报来看，在有意愿参与对赌激励的受访者中，有X%的样本认为2倍的收益杠杆（即收益/成本=X倍）有对赌吸引力，X%的样本认为3倍的收益杠杆更有吸引力。同时，从投入来看，X%的样本认为总薪酬的5%-10%为更能接受的投入本金。

From the perspective of return, among the respondents who are willing to participate in the gambling incentive, X% of the samples think that 2 times of the revenue leverage (i.e. revenue / cost = x times) is attractive to gambling, and X% of the samples think that 3 times of the revenue leverage is more attractive. At the same time, from the perspective of investment, X% of the samples think that 5% - 10% of the total salary is the more acceptable investment principal.

排除希望以小博大，或者悲观预期只能以大博小的样本，愿意投入X%-X%获取X倍杠杆回报的反馈多，占愿意参与对赌激励样本的X%。所以，我们可以把这些数字设置为Baseline。

Excluding the sample that hopes to be small, or pessimistic expectation can only be small, the feedback that is willing to invest x% - x% to obtain x-fold leverage return is the most, accounting for X% of the sample willing to participate in gambling incentive. So we can set these numbers to baseline.

再说奖金池的问题。

Let's talk about the bonus pool.

参与调研的企业中，有超过60%的企业会为创造直接价值的项目划定专门奖金池，这说明过半数的企业已经意识到应该走向“用户付薪”。

More than 60% of the enterprises participating in the survey will set a special bonus pool for the projects that create direct value, which indicates that more than half of the enterprises have realized that they should move towards "user pay".

当然，通过追访典型企业，我们也发现，在这种逻辑里，大多企业并未在项目的价值创造和奖金池之间建立强因果关系，依然采用了“预算划拨奖金包”等传统激励逻辑。

Of course, through the follow-up of typical enterprises, we also found that in this logic, most enterprises did not establish a strong causal relationship between the value creation of the project and the bonus pool, and still used the traditional incentive logic such as "budget allocation bonus package".

说白了，钱依然不是直接来自用户，而是来自公司的划拨。当然，你可以说这种划拨也是来自项目的价值创造，但通过公司“转”了一层，不是直接从项目收益里提成，感觉还是不一样。这会造成激励效果大大衰减，扭曲了平台型组织的激励指向。

To put it bluntly, money still does not come directly from users, but from the company's allocation. Of course, you can say that this kind of allocation also comes from the value creation of the project, but it's still different to "transfer" a layer through the company rather than directly commission from the project income. This will result in the attenuation of incentive effect and distort the incentive direction of platform organization.

少数企业尝试基于价值创造来提取奖金池，但我们发现他们并未建立合理的“超额利润分享逻辑”。此类企业奖金的提取相对粗放，要么造成了老板不舒服，要么造成了员工不舒服，这类激励制度极有可能不能持续。

A few enterprises try to extract bonus pool based on value creation, but we find that they have not established a reasonable "logic of excess profit sharing". This kind of enterprise bonus extraction is relatively extensive, either caused the boss uncomfortable, or caused the staff uncomfortable, this kind of incentive system is likely to be unsustainable.